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Abstract: In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or 
fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between 
different uses of language as mentioned in On Certainty and his distinction between meaningful, 
senseless, and nonsense statements in the Tractatus. This comparison has three advantages: first, it 
allows us to clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in On Certainty; second, it 
illuminates the relationship between some features of special propositions in On Certainty and the 
characteristics that define senseless statements in the Tractatus; and, finally, it shows the status of 
the so-called insight-ful nonsenses in the Tractatus. As a consequence of this argument, I believe in 
a halfway house between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of Tractatus. 
 
1. Sense and scepticism 
In his last text, On Certainty, Wittgenstein develops his ideas on scepticism and the limits of 
knowledge. At the end of his life, Wittgenstein sought to describe the structure of knowledge and 
derive epistemological conclusions from his linguistic analysis of epistemic terms. A good way to 
understand the epistemological entries that On Certainty contains, is to reflect upon Wittgenstein's 
analysis of the notion of doubt. His reflections on the notion of doubt, its role in our language, and 
the linguistic and action-based behaviours associated with its use allow him to distinguish 
knowledge from certainty, and to view scepticism in a new way. 
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy in relation to scepticism succeeds or 
fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. As part of this general objective, I will establish a 
comparison between different uses of language that Wittgenstein mentions in On Certainty and his 
distinction between what has sense (is meaningful), what lacks it (is senseless) and what is absurd (is 
nonsense) in Tractatus. In my opinion, this comparison has three advantages: first, it allows to 
clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in On Certainty; second, it illuminates the 
relationship between some features that belong to special propositions in On Certainty and the 
characteristics that define what is senseless in Tractatus; and, last, it shows the status of the so-called 
insight-ful nonsenses in Tractatus. As a consequence of this argument, I believe in a halfway house 
between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of Tractatus. The results of this comparison 
support also the thesis that Wittgenstein’s work, beyond its distinction in different periods, has a 
conceptual continuity. 
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2. Analysis of the notion of "doubt" 
In On Certainty Wittgenstein points out that the sceptical doubt is not, even if it seems to be, 
a radicalisation of daily doubt. On the contrary, it is something rather different. He emphasizes that 
in the process that goes from doubting a particular something to doubting anything in general, our 
doubt gradually looses its meaning. At some point, it even ceases to be intelligible: 
For it is not true that a mistake merely gets more and more improbable as we pass from the 
planet to my own hand. No; at some point it has ceased to be conceivable. (C §54) 
In my opinion, Wittgenstein's most interesting argument against global scepticism lies in his 
assertion that any doubt presupposes the command of a language game. That is, we can only doubt a 
proposition if we first understand what the proposition means. I can only deny that I know that this is 
a hand, if I have previously understood what it means to say that this is a hand: 
“I don’t know if this is a hand” But do you know what the word “hand” means? And don’t 
say “I know what it means now for me”. And isn’t it an empirical fact — that this word is 
used like this? (C §306) 
Wittgenstein states that understanding a proposition requires us to know how to use that 
proposition correctly. Hence, any doubt we may place upon a proposition must take into account the 
language game in which that proposition is embedded. In other words, we cannot deny a proposition 
independently of our linguistic practices: 
”What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?” … But someone who asks such 
a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-
game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like? (C §24) 
As a result of this approach, Wittgenstein concludes that doubting must always come to an 
end. A speaker who raises questions without stopping at some point, does not abide by the rules that 
govern our communicative praxis. The game of questions and answers has its own rules, and they 
must be observed. There comes a point when it makes no sense to raise further questions. Thus 
whoever perseveres in raising objections, does not play the game of doubting well. When the sceptic 
exercises his doubt without coming to an end, he places himself out of the language game that 
doubting consists in. 
Hence, Wittgenstein appeals to our linguistic practices and the way we learn them, to show 
that we can doubt particular facts in particular circumstances, but that we cannot doubt them all at 
the same time. In this manner, he shows that sustaining global? sceptical doubt implies rejecting our 
linguistic practices. But this is just not a possibility. It is important to clarify here that Wittgenstein 
does not refer to a mere incapacity on our part, but to an essential feature of what judging is: 
“We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all. Would not 
it be more correct to say: “we do not doubt them all”. Our not doubting them all is simply 
our manner of judging, and therefore of acting. (C §232) 
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A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt. (C §450) 
What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can’t I imagine it at all? 
What would I believe if I didn’t believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this 
doubt might exist. (C §247) 
In the above paragraphs we have seen that doubts presuppose a language game. When we 
introduce a doubt within a language game, it has sense. But if we try to construct a doubt out of the 
language game in which we are embedded, or if we try to build a doubt against the language game as 
a whole, then our doubt will lack any sense. Wittgenstein's arguments show that any doubt 
presupposes the existence of something that cannot be doubted, that is, doubts are possible only 
because certainty exists. The game of doubting presupposes certainty: 
If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of 
doubting presupposes certainty. (C §115) 
 Thus we arrive to the end of Wittgenstein's critique of scepticism. The core of his 
argumentation lies in asking the following: What kind of doubts does the sceptic raise? To what 
extent is it valid to insert those doubts in the language game in which we live? His answer to these 
questions emphasizes that some aspects of our thoughts cannot be doubted, since they are that which 
allows the formulation of doubt. Thus the analysis of the sceptical doubt —its premises and 
consequences— allows him to prove that any doubt presupposes the existence of a domain of 
certainty and hence, that scepticism must be mistaken. 
Of course, Wittgenstein's acceptance of the existence of certainty forces us to clarify what he 
understands by that term. I turn to this point now. 
 
3. The realm of certainty 
3.1. Special propositions  
Wittgenstein appeals to our common reaction against sceptical doubts to conclude that the 
sceptic's use of daily language is mistaken. We realize that something goes wrong with sceptical 
doubts when we are unable to sustain them. Sceptical doubt ceases to be meaningful to us as soon as 
we cannot support it anymore. 
This remark involves a great discovery. At some point in the process of questioning whether 
a claim is valid, we notice that we have touched ground level. We find then that some propositions 
of our language stand so firmly in front of us that they are no longer questionable [in the following, 
we will refer to these propositions as special or privileged propositions]:  
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. (C §341) 
The reason why there can be neither doubt nor proof of these special propositions, is that any 
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question or argument we may try to develop, must start from the assumption of their validity. Thus 
any inquiry about the extension of our knowledge is built upon the validity of these special 
propositions, since everything we judge as being knowledge presupposes them. To accept their 
validity is just the way we inquire about the limits of our knowledge. 
It is important to stress that, according to Wittgenstein, these privileged propositions are not 
empirical. They lie at the foundations of our discourse, and support all the other propositions we 
utter, which belong to the specific language game for which they provide the foundations. Hence 
they are not the result of an empirical investigation, but they make that very inquiry possible. This 
means that whilst any other empirical proposition measures its validity in relation to the privileged 
propositions, the latter do not require further justification: 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were 
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened 
but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and 
hard ones became fluid. (C §96) 
At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. (C §253) 
In effect, our language allows us neither to prove nor to review issues like, for example, the 
existence of our hands or of the earth –except on very few occasions that we will mention later. 
Since every time we raise doubts about these facts "language goes on holiday", to use the famous 
metaphor of Philosophical Investigations (PI §38). In brief, the language game in which we are 
immersed presupposes the existence of a set of propositions that are certain. This set of propositions 
governs our communicative practices as rules of discourse whose function is not so much to pass on 
information about the world as to organize our linguistic exchanges. In this sense, we can say that 
the special propositions we are talking about constitute the grammar of our language, [thus they can 
also be named grammatical propositions]: 
Now might not “I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my hand” be conceived as a 
proposition of grammar? (C §57) 
 
3.2. Meaningful, nonsense and senseless  
These reflections suggest that in On Certainty Wittgenstein constructs a tripartite 
classification of the propositions of our language [that is, of the applications of sentences or, what is 
the same, of the sentences in certain uses], as follows. First, empirical propositions, whose meaning 
and truth value depend upon the context in which we use them. That is the case of the sentence "I 
know this is a hand" when the victim pronounces it. Second, propositions which we may call 
philosophical, that lack meaning in any related context. This is the case of a sentence like "There are 
physical objects" when introduced in a philosophical discourse. [To be sure, we can imagine a 
perfectly legitimate application of this latter sentence. Let us just imagine two astronauts travelling 
in the void, who looking through the window of their spaceship, say: “Look, there are physical 
objects” pointing at small rocks passing them. In this case, it will be a meaningful proposition in an 
 5
empirical context. It is thus particular [philosophical] applications of it that are nonsensical.] Third, 
propositions that seem to be empirical but that, in certain contexts, become grammatical 
propositions. Such is the case of the above sentence when we introduce it in a discussion with the 
sceptic. 
The above distinctions about the way a sentence can have meaning or lack it, play an 
essential role in Wittgenstein's argument. Empirical propositions present no problem of 
interpretation when they are pronounced in the appropriate circumstances, since then they make full 
sense. Philosophical sentences can also be straightforwardly evaluated, since according to 
Wittgenstein they are completely absurd. The real difficulty arises, however, in relation to the so-
called grammatical propositions. 
Thus to understand the way Wittgenstein solves the question of meaning to their respect, I 
suggest we turn to a classification that appeared already in Tractatus. Wittgenstein distinguished 
there between three types of propositions: meaningful (sinnig), nonsensical (unsinnig) and senseless 
(sinnlos). I think that this distinction can be useful when applied to the special propositions of On 
Certainty in question. 
For Wittgenstein meets the sphere of certainty when he reflects upon the conditions of 
intelligibility of some propositions. He then discovers that the same sentence can have different 
conditions of intelligibility, depending on the context in which the sentence is uttered. Thus whether 
a proposition like "I know this is a hand" makes sense or not, depends upon the circumstances in 
which it is pronounced. If we introduce this sentence in a daily conversation as an empirical 
observation —for example, if a victim utters these words after opening a package containing a 
bomb—, then it will be meaningful (sinnig), and will have a truth value ascribed to it. However, if 
we pronounce the sentence "I know this is a hand" in a philosophical discussion and interpret it as if 
it were an empirical proposition —as the sceptic and G. E. Moore do—, the proposition becomes a 
nonsense (Unsinn). Finally, if we use the sentence in the context of a philosophical discussion and 
we interpret it as a grammatical rule —as Wittgenstein does—, then —according to my thesis— it 
will become senseless (sinnlos). 
Following this interpretative hypothesis, some features that define special propositions in On 
Certainty are shared by the definition of senseless propositions in Tractatus. We must then explore 
further this approach. To that aim I will draw a comparison between the role of grammatical 
propositions in On Certainty and the role of characteristically senseless propositions in the 
Tractatus, namely, logical propositions. 
 
3.3. Comparison between the role of grammatical propositions and the role of logical 
propositions 
In Tractatus Wittgenstein explained that logical propositions did not have sense. But in 
relation to them he introduced the important distinction between being nonsensical (unsinnig) and 
being senseless (sinnlos). Logical propositions are not absurd, but senseless, that is, they lack 
meaning at all. This assertion becomes clear when we remember his definition of logical 
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propositions as tautological (TLP 6.1) and certain (TLP 4.464). The description implies that nothing 
of what may happen in the world can ever affect them, neither to confirm nor to refute them (TLP 
6.1222). He thus sustains that logical propositions do not convey any information and they say 
nothing (TLP 6.11). He also claims that they lack semantic content or have zero content. [A parallel 
analysis is to be applied to contradictions.] 
We can now apply the definition of logical propositions to our understanding of grammatical 
propositions in On Certainty. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that logical propositions are 
certain and tautological, lack semantic content, do not convey any information, and must be 
therefore considered meaningless. In a similar way, in On Certainty Wittgenstein considers that 
grammatical propositions form a certain and unchangeable structure, do not transmit any 
information either, and can therefore be also considered meaningless. [It should be remembered, 
nevertheless, that their being meaningless ultimately depends on the context in which they are being 
uttered.] 
Nonetheless, we must be very careful at this point. These reflections could make us believe 
that the role of grammatical propositions in On Certainty is similar to the role that logical 
propositions played in a former period of Wittgenstein's intellectual development. However, we 
should not put too much trust in the advantages of this identification, since there are important 
differences between both types of sentences. In my opinion, these differences exhibit precisely the 
extent to which the propositional treatment of the realm of certainty poses insurmountable 
difficulties. 
One of the differences is Wittgenstein's emphasis that the fact that grammatical propositions 
are certain, does not imply either that they are true or false. This assertion implies that grammatical 
propositions in On Certainty are not tautologies in the sense in which logical propositions in the 
Tractatus are. At the end of his life, Wittgenstein is convinced that a discussion about truth or 
falsehood does not apply in the case of grammatical propositions. But —and this is my point— if we 
rule out the idea that grammatical propositions are true or false, it will not be possible to consider 
them "propositions" in a strict sense, since according to the classical definition a proposition is a 
linguistic expression that can bear a truth value. 
The following is a second difference that should act as a caution when comparing notions 
that belong to different periods of Wittgenstein's career. While logical propositions are not usually 
employed in the context of learning, some grammatical propositions can be used to that purpose. 
Thus, while it does not make sense to tell a child "It rains or it does not rain" to teach her something 
about rain1, we can teach her something if we say "This is a hand". Before we have supposed that 
grammatical propositions are meaningless and do not convey any information. As we see it now, the 
role of these propositions is to govern our language games, that is, to establish the meaning of the set 
                         
1 Of course, saying to a child “Either it is raining or it is not raining” could be part of inculcating her into 
the practice of classical logic. (Adrian Moore once pointed me a delicious footnote on page 308 of  Brian 
McGuinness’s biography of Wittgenstein. In the main text he writes: “In Wittgenstein’s example, I know 
nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining”. Then in a footnote, after 
giving the reference, he adds: “He had been out of England for some time when he wrote this”. 
Wonderful!) 
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of propositions in our language. From this perspective, grammatical propositions do not lack sense 
nor are they meaningless, but they carry information about the way we use certain terms. Again, this 
difference points out a key role of grammatical propositions which does not fit well with their 
characterization as "propositions". 
A third factor to take into account is that Wittgenstein uses grammatical propositions in On 
Certainty to build the syntactical skeleton of our language. Given how the Tractatus works, 
however, logical propositions are not, strictly speaking, the formal framework of the world: rather, 
simple objects are. Tautologies and contradictions are not that which renders the world possible, 
rather language is possible because objects are simple. But the Tractatus’ proposition “Objects are 
simple” is nonsensical, not senseless. If we follow this train of thought, should we then consider 
grammatical propositions also as nonsensical? 
As a consequence of these three difficulties, the next section explores an alternative 
interpretative hypothesis, namely, to consider grammatical propositions as absurd (unsinnig). 
 
3.4. Traditional vs. New interpretations of Wittgenstein: a middle path 
The non-propositional character of certainty is shown by the idea that the so-called special 
propositions do not depict facts about the world but regulate the rules of our language. They say 
something about how we think, about our symbology. This idea helps to deepen the comparative 
analysis between the different uses of language in On Certainty and the types of propositions in 
Tractatus which I am proposing. In the above section we have seen which aspects special and 
senseless propositions share and which ones divide them. In this section we will approach the 
relation between the special and the nonsensical propositions. 
In recent years, a fierce dispute among scholars on the nature of nonsense in Tractatus has 
arisen. The mainstream [defended paradigmatically by Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker] sustains that 
there are two types of nonsense: absolute nonsense (or, with other words, incorrect nonsense, 
insight-less nonsense, gibberish nonsense), and interesting nonsense (also named, correct nonsense, 
insight-ful nonsense, or non-gibberish nonsense): 
(i) Propositions belonging to the first type, gibberish or absolute nonsenses, violate the rules of 
logical syntax and the boundaries of sense: they are thus conceptual impossibilities. Among the 
examples of this group are, of course, sentences like “Err to ja”, but also philosophical propositions 
that talk on aesthetics, ethics or personal identity, like for example “No one can have my thought”. 
Wittgenstein accepts that the term nonsense is used to exclude different things for different reasons. 
“The only difference between ordinary and philosophical nonsense is that between patent nonsense 
which causes no confusion since we recognize it inmediately by the “jingle of words” and, latent 
nonsense, “where operations are required to enable us to recognize it as nonsense” (AWL 64; PI 
§464, 524; LWL 98). 
(ii) Propositions belonging to the second type, interesting or insight-ful nonsenses, are not based on 
misunderstandings of logical syntax, they rather express insights into the workings of logical syntax. 
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In that respect, they convey important insights about what makes language possible, in other words, 
they express something important about what underpins it. The Tractatus’ statements fall under this 
heading, for example, “Objects are simple”. They are pseudo-propositions that try to say what can 
only be shown. In Tractatus interesting or insight-ful nonsenses are correct unsayables, but correct 
nonetheless. (TLP 4.12ss., 5.534s., 6.54s.; NB 20.10.14). 
 The alternative position, defended by the group of new Wittgensteinians (among others, Cora 
Diamond or James Conant), maintains that nonsense never conveys insight. There is thus no useful 
or important nonsense. [It is not possible to be in the external point of view: the ladder cannot cross 
the border.] 
In our case, the analysis of the extent to which special propositions resemble nonsensical and 
senseless propositions, leads me to adopt the following conclusions. I have argued, firstly, that the 
propositions that are certain to us are important or valuably correct. This thesis captures the idea that 
in On Certainty Wittgenstein points out that special propositions do not say anything about the 
world [they do not bring knowledge of the world], rather they regulate the rules of discourse as 
well as our behaviour in the world [they bring understanding of the world]. I think this 
description of special propositions in On Certainty helps to illuminate the status of insight-ful 
nonsenses in the Tractatus. The latter express insights on the workings of logical syntax, the 
show something on how we think, on our symbology; they show something about how language 
is possible, and about what underpines it. According to my interpretation, hinge propositions are 
nonsensical but convey valuable insights on what makes language possible. Thus the role of such 
special propositions in On Certainty could therefore be related to the role of insight-ful 
nonsenses in the Tractatus. On the status of philosophical propositions, On Certainty closes the 
circle open in the Tractatus. [This connection supports the idea that Wittgenstein’s theory, at 
least to this respect, is a continuous, against the standard interpretation according to which the 
first and late Wittgenstein are radically different.] 
Secondly, my argument locates which aspects of special propositions remind us of the nature 
of gibberish or complete nonsenses, and which other features instead make them closer to senseless 
propositions. As a consequence, I believe in a halfway house between the traditional and the new 
interpretations of the Tractatus on this matter. For I accept, on the one side, that there are two types 
of nonsense, while I also think, on the other side, that one group of propositions, the special 
propositions that are central to Wittgenstein’s concern in On Certainty, share features with both 
types. 
 
3.5. Facticity and understanding 
When Wittgenstein reflects upon the nature of the grammatical propositions, he realizes that 
what is truly important about them is not so much that they look like propositions, but that they 
contain the norms that govern our discourse and behaviour. We must therefore conclude that what 
we have called special propositions do not, in fact, belong to our language as an additional element, 
but rather constitute what hangs language together. This supports the idea that, in the final instance, 
Wittgenstein favoured a non-propositional characterization of certainty. 
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It is at this stage that he appeals to a set of different phenomena that constitute the foundation 
of our thoughts, expressions and actions. He refers to them with different names such as, for 
example, the inherited tradition, the community of origin, our behaviour, our animality, and even our 
mythology. All of which are non-intellectual phenomena that can perhaps be subsumed under the 
head of "facticity". Thus his inquiries led him to the verification of the existence of a sphere beyond 
language which includes an enormous variety of elements. Wittgenstein will use the term "certainty" 
to refer to that which supports all our thoughts, expressions and actions. The exploration of the rules 
of language refers us to a realm beyond language which can't be further analysed. The inquiry comes 
to an end when we understand that the field of certainty exists and constitutes us, but that we cannot 
make its nature explicit. At the end, what is certain and why it is certain, remains beyond our 
understanding. 
 
4. Evaluation of the sceptical position 
The conclusions we have reached above can help us understand Wittgenstein's answer to 
scepticism. As we have seen, Wittgenstein rejects the validity of the sceptical claim "I doubt whether 
the world exists because I don't know whether I am dreaming that the world exists". His argument 
shows that the sceptic's use of the terms "doubt", "know", "dream", and "world" is completely 
different from the normal use of the terms in the sceptic's community of origin. Wittgenstein's 
analysis reveals the extent to which the propositions that the sceptic tries to attack, function as 
certainties in our language. Through this criticism, Wittgenstein denies that an individual could state 
sceptical doubts about a particular use of language since this use is legitimised by the community of 
speakers as a whole. 
Wittgenstein's argument in this respect is convincing. As a result, it is generally believed that 
his linguistic analysis demonstrates that the sceptical challenge is no longer dangerous for 
epistemology. In my view, however, this conclusion is rather superficial and too optimistic, since 
Wittgenstein's approach to knowledge contains gaps which leave room for doubt. Wittgenstein 
succeeds in his reductio ad absurdum of scepticism when it is introduced at an individual level 
within daily practice. I cannot say meaningfully that I do not know whether this is a hand, while I am 
using it to type this paper. But it is less clear whether Wittgenstein's position can confront 
successfully a more severe type of scepticism. By this I mean the kind of scepticism which does not 
involve certain linguistic practices, but the system of language itself. 
Wittgenstein discovered the importance of this second type of scepticism when he realized 
that its specificity is not grasped when the sceptical attitude is described as a mere generalization of 
empirical doubt. On the contrary, the peculiarity of scepticism lies in the way it forces us to enquire 
about the rules of use of our language. This type of questioning of the use of language within a 
community appears, for example, when we ask ourselves how to identify the propositions that are 
certainties in that community. Despite his efforts to reject scepticism at this level, Wittgenstein was 
eventually obliged to admit that, in the final instance, it is impossible to identify these propositions. 
The reason behind this conclusion is Wittgenstein's thesis that the same expression can have 
meaning in certain circumstances, whereas it has none in others. Thus it makes sense to say "I know 
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that I have a hand" after opening a package containing a bomb, but most of the time the proposition 
"I have a hand" has an ascription of certainty. From this fact we can conclude that any questioning 
about whether a proposition is meaningful, about whether it can be known, and also about whether it 
is certain, demands further exploration of the circumstances in which the proposition is uttered. 
Therefore, the problem that the thesis of the diversity of senses raises is how to know in which 
circumstances it is or is not appropriate to immerse oneself in a lively discussion about the meaning 
of a proposition or about its description as certain or as knowledge. 
Now —and this is a delicate point— when we try to clarify which circumstances correspond 
to which language games, a serious obstacle appears. The setting requires us to pay attention to the 
conditions of use of our sentences or, what is the same, to appeal to "normal circumstances" as the 
framework into which our declarations fit. At this point, however, Wittgenstein recognizes that we 
do not possess —and even more significantly, that we cannot possess— any method to distinguish 
under which circumstances a claim to knowledge or certainty is correct: 
If, however, one wanted to give something like a rule here, then it would contain the 
expression “in normal circumstances”. And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot 
precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones. (C §27) 
The proposition itself tells us neither when its insertion in some contexts is pertinent, nor 
when it is superfluous. Besides, any rule we may conceive to determine the context of use will have, 
according to Wittgenstein, an open character. If the "normal circumstances" under which we may 
use our sentences cannot be specified, that is, if there are no rules to use our propositions, then it is 
not possible to identify which propositions are certain. 
These considerations lead us to conclude that Wittgenstein's position cannot reject a type of 
scepticism whose objective is to warn us of the impossibility of understanding our own position in 
the world. This raises an interesting issue, that is, Wittgenstein's recognition of the limits of 
philosophical reflection. In this sense, one consequence of his analysis of epistemic terms is his 
thesis that it is impossible to justify the logic behind our language, and hence, we can only assume 
its facticity. 
Now it is precisely on this issue that Wittgenstein gives the definite and certainly most 
polemical turn of the screw in his argumentation. He argues that the temptation to seek the 
foundations of our language games by looking for their finality or their essence is mistaken. 
Linguistic analysis comes to an end when we recognize the existence of propositions that are certain. 
This means that it is not necessary to justify their certainty, on the contrary, it is sufficient to 
understand that they exist. In fact, this is the only movement which is valid philosophically. 
Ultimately, the idea that we cannot justify our system of meanings does not imply, according to 
Wittgenstein, that we can pose doubts about it. It makes no sense to think it might be false, in the 
same way that it makes no sense to think it might be true. 
 
5. The limits of language and the philosophical task 
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Wittgenstein's assertion that first philosophy or metaphysics is impossible, and that we do 
not need to worry about this fact, inspires two different considerations about the possibilities of the 
success of global scepticism. On the one hand, one could consider that the substratum of certainty 
shapes us in such a way that we lack the necessary perspective to grasp it from the outside. This 
approach would define global scepticism as unintelligible because no sceptical doubt would be able 
to eliminate our certainties. 
On the other hand, I claim that to suppose that there is an unattainable and irrefutable core of 
certainty implies, precisely, that we are begging the question against scepticism. From this 
perspective, the postulation of a field of certainties would be a debatable strategy that cannot meet its 
objective of refuting scepticism. 
The above dilemma leaves us with the problem of deciding which of the two positions is 
correct. In my opinion, once we have arrived at this point, any decision we might make implies 
begging the question. In other words, the reasons behind our decision do not need to be accepted by 
the two parties involved, i.e., the sceptic and his opponent. Thus the playing field is no longer a 
rational discussion, but the discussion takes place in a sphere prior to it. In accordance with a 
recurrent feature of Wittgenstein's thought, one might venture the hypothesis that the nature of this 
problem is, in fact, ethical [in the sense of being related to a choice of life or an attitude]. 
To conclude, I would like to highlight a feature that has traditionally defined the 
philosophical task, i.e., the fact that the philosopher sometimes asked a question without awaiting a 
response, or without aspiring to achieve it. In the eyes of the traditional epistemologist, the 
discussion about scepticism showed that the inquiry about knowledge was legitimate, even if there 
was no definite answer to it. Wittgenstein belongs to that same tradition in which, while the 
philosopher is well aware of the limits of human knowledge, he still takes seriously the possibility of 
inquiring. In relation to this point, we must recall the important category of nonsense (unsinnig) but 
valuable of Tractatus. [Maybe the problem of scepticism belongs to the same field of reality he used 
to call the mystical.] 
In any case, Wittgenstein's discussion about scepticism shows, in my opinion, that 
philosophical questions are worth researching. Our last reaction may be silence but to arrive at this 
conclusion it is necessary to cover beforehand a long argumentative path. 
 
6. Closing the circle 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein develops a logical analysis of language, and concludes by 
showing that language cannot account for its last premises, namely, the facticity of the world. The 
path that the late Wittgenstein covers puts into practice his thesis that philosophy is not a theory, but 
an activity. In other words, philosophy cannot bring knowledge about the facts of the world; through 
the method of connective analysis, it can rather bring understanding of our logical, grammatical and 
thought structures.2
                         
2 This paper has a distant ancestor in chapter five of my PhD thesis (Villarmea 2003). I would like to 
 12
                                                                 
 
Bibliography 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961). (Abbreviated TLP). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Notebooks 1914-16, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, tr. G. E. 
M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1961). (Abbreviated NB). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35, from the notes of Alice 
Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, ed. Alice Ambrose (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979). 
(Abbreviated AWL). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32, from the notes of John King 
and Desmond Lee Macdonald, ed. Desmond Lee (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980). (Abbreviated 
LWL). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr. G. E. 
M. Anscombe, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958). (Abbreviated PI). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. Paul and 
G. E. M. Anscombe, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1969). (Abbreviated C). 
Glock, Hans-John, A Wittgenstein’s Dictionary (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996). 
Stroll, Avrum, Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994). 
 
 
thank Peter Hacker, Adrian Moore, David Pears, Chon Tejedor, Óscar González Castán, and Herman 
Philipse for their valuable comments and suggestions on a previous draft, as well as to Chon Tejedor and 
Jane Barton for kindly revising my English version. 
 
